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In the standard model of quantum secret sharing, typically, one is interested in minimal authorized sets for
the reconstruction of the secret. In such a setting, reconstruction requires the communication of all the shares
of the corresponding authorized set. If we allow for non-minimal authorized sets, then we can trade off the size
of the authorized sets with the amount of communication required for reconstruction. Based on the staircase
codes, proposed by Bitar and El Rouayheb, we propose a class of quantum threshold secret sharing schemes
that are also communication efficient. We call them ((k, 2k − 1, d)) communication efficient quantum secret
sharing schemes where k ≤ d ≤ 2k− 1. Using the proposed construction, we can recover a secret of d− k+1
qudits by communicating d qudits whereas using the standard ((k, 2k − 1)) quantum secret sharing requires
k(d − k + 1) qudits to be communicated. In other words, to share a secret of one qudit, the standard quantum
secret sharing requires k qudits whereas the proposed schemes communicate only d
d−k+1
qudits per qudit in
the communication complexity. Proposed schemes can reduce communication overheads by a factor O(k)
with respect to standard schemes, when d equals 2k − 1. Further, we show that our schemes have optimal
communication cost for secret reconstruction.
Introduction. A quantum secret sharing (QSS) scheme is a
protocol by which a dealer can distribute an arbitrary secret
state (in an encoded form) among n participants so that only
authorized subsets of participants can reconstruct the secret
[1–8]. The secret can be a classical or quantum state. The
states distributed to the participants are called shares. Follow-
ing the distribution of the secret by the dealer, certain subsets
of the participants can, at a later time, recover the secret.
A subset of parties that can reconstruct the secret is called
an authorized set. Any subset of parties that have no infor-
mation about the secret is called an unauthorized set. In this
paper we are only interested in perfect secret sharing schemes
where a subset is either authorized or unauthorized. In re-
construction phase, the participants constituting an authorized
set pool their shares together and then recover the secret. Al-
ternatively, the participants could communicate their shares
to a third party or user, called the combiner, whose job is to
recover the secret from the data communicated to the com-
biner. In this model, a metric of interest is the amount of com-
munication between the participants and the combiner. The
amount of communication from the participants to the com-
biner is called the communication cost.
In this paper, we initiate the study of communication ef-
ficient quantum secret sharing schemes for quantum secrets,
opening a new avenue for further research in quantum se-
cret sharing. We propose schemes which aim to minimize
the communication cost of quantum secret sharing schemes.
While the problem of communication cost in classical secret
sharing schemes was studied previously, [9–14], the corre-
sponding problem for quantum secret sharing schemes has not
been studied thus far. Quantum secret sharing has become ex-
perimentally viable and there are many demonstrations, see
for instance [15–22]. However, quantum information is still
an expensive resource, and clearly, we would like to reduce
the cost of storing and transmitting it. Our results should be
of interest to experimentalists as well.
The collection of authorized sets is called the access struc-
ture (denoted as Γ) of the secret sharing scheme. We focus
on an important class of secret sharing schemes, namely, the
((k, n)) quantum threshold schemes (QTS) where any subset
of t participants with k ≤ t ≤ n can reconstruct the secret.
Contributions. Based on the staircase codes proposed by Bitar
et al. [9], we propose a class of quantum threshold secret
sharing schemes that are also communication efficient. In the
standard model of quantum secret sharing, sharing a secret of
one qudit using a ((k, 2k − 1)) threshold scheme requires k
qudits to be communicated to reconstruct the secret. In the
proposed schemes, we can recover the secret of m = d −
k + 1 qudits by communicating d qudits where k < d ≤
2k − 1, in average dd−k+1 qudits for every qudit in secret.
Further, we show that these schemes are optimal with respect
to communication cost in the given model of quantum secret
sharing.
Previous Work. The closest work related to ours appears to
be that of [23] who also aimed at reducing the communica-
tion cost in quantum secret sharing schemes. However, there
are important differences, their work uses a combination of
non-perfect secret sharing schemes along with a hybrid quan-
tum secret sharing scheme. A hybrid QSS scheme is one
which participants have (partly or wholly) classical shares.
Our schemes in contrast are purely quantum in that no share
is classical. Furthermore, the work in [23] is concerned with
the communication cost of the secret sharing schemes during
distribution of the (encoded) secret more than the cost during
reconstruction which is our focus here.
A Motivating Example. The intuition behind the communi-
cation efficient secret sharing schemes lies in using a non-
minimal authorized set to recover the secret. (An authorized
set is said to be a minimal authorized set if every proper
subset of the authorized set is unable to recover the secret.)
Let Fq denote the finite field with q elements. Consider the
ternary ((2, 3)) quantum threshold scheme proposed by Cleve
et al [3]. In this scheme, the secret state s ∈ F3 is encoded
into three qudits as |s〉 7→ 1√
3
∑2
r=0 |r〉A |s+ r〉B |2s+ r〉C
2where the one qudit each is given to partiesA,B andC. In or-
der to reconstruct the secret we need to communicate two qu-
dits to the combiner. We propose an alternate ((2, 3)) quantum
threshold scheme where we can obtain better communication
costs. In this scheme (s1, s2) ∈ F
2
3 is encoded as follows:
|s1s2〉 7→
∑
r1,r2∈F3
|s1 + r1, r2〉A
|s2 + r1, r1 + r2〉B
|s1 + s2 + r1, r1 + 2r2〉C
(1)
where we have ignored the normalizing factors. In this case,
the secret is encoded into six qudits, equivalently each secret
qudit is encoded into three qudits as in previous scheme [3].
Let us look at the reconstruction of the secret from the four
qudits of the first two participants A and B from the state as
given in Eq. (1). The reconstruction steps are similar for other
choices of two participants as well. (Values of qudits which
have changed after each operation are indicated in bold.) By
subtracting the value of second qudit of A from that of B, we
can obtain the following state.
∑
r1,r2∈F3
|s1 + r1, r2〉A
|s2 + r1, r1〉B
|s1 + s2 + r1, r1 + 2r2〉C
By subtracting the value of the second qudit of B from the
values of the first qudits of A and B,∑
r1,r2∈F3
|s1, r2〉A |s2, r1〉B |s1 + s2 + r1, r1 + 2r2〉C
We can now obtain the following state
|s1〉A |s2〉B
∑
r1,r2∈F3
|s1 + s2 + r1〉B |r1 + 2r2〉A
|s1 + s2 + r1〉C |r1 + 2r2〉C
This does not end the reconstruction process because the se-
cret could be still entangled with the rest of the system and we
may not be able to recover an arbitrary superposition. Further
steps are required to recover the secret completely. Setting
t1 = s1 + s2 + r1 and then t2 = t1 + 2s1 + 2s2 + 2r2, we
obtain the following state
|s1〉A |s2〉B
∑
t1,r2∈F3
|t1〉B |t1 + 2s1 + 2s2 + 2r2〉A
|t1〉C |t1 + 2s1 + 2s2 + 2r2〉C
= |s1〉A |s2〉B
∑
t1,t2∈F3
|t1〉B |t2〉A |t1〉C |t2〉C
At this point the secret is found to be completely disentangled
with the rest of the qudits and the state of the remaining qudits
is independent of the secret, thereby ensuring we can recover
an arbitrary linear combination of basis states.
Let us recover the secret when we have access to all three
participants (they constitute a non-minimal authorized set).
We do not need to have access to all the six qudits of the par-
ticipants. Just three qudits i.e., one qudit, specifically the first
qudit, from each share will suffice. By unitary operations on
these three qudits of the state in Eq. (1), we obtain,∑
r1,r2∈F3
|s1, r2〉A |s2, r1 + r2〉B |r1, r1 + 2r2〉C
Reordering the qudits, we have
|s1〉A |s2〉B
∑
r1,r2
|r1〉C |r2〉A |r1 + r2〉B |r1 + 2r2〉C
Once again the secret is completely disentangled from the rest
of the system and we are able to recover the secret using only
three qudits. However, note that in this case we are able to re-
cover a secret of two qudits. Had we used the ((2, 3)) thresh-
old scheme of Cleve et al., we would have needed four qudits
even when we allow access to all the three participants. This
example demonstrates we can reduce the number of qudits to
be communicated when reconstructing the secret.
Proposed Communication Efficient Quantum Secret Sharing
Schemes. To specify a quantum secret sharing concretely, we
give the encoding for the basis states of the secret. An encod-
ing E realizes a perfect quantum secret sharing scheme with
access structure Γ if it satisfies the following constraints [16].
i) (Recoverability) Any set in Γ can recover the secret.
ii) (Secrecy) Any set not in Γ has no information about the
secret.
To show recoverability, we explictly show that the set can re-
cover the secret. To show secrecy, we show that the comple-
ment of the set contains an authorized set. A quantum secret
sharing scheme is said to be a pure state scheme if encodes
pure state secrets to global pure states.
We denote by ((k, n, d))q a q-ary quantum threshold
scheme with n participants, where any k participants can re-
cover the secret and d > k participants can recover the secret
with lower communication cost. We suppress the subscript
for convenience. We assume that number of participants is
n = 2k− 1 and fewer than k cannot recover the secret. Fix an
integer k ≤ d ≤ n, and a prime q > n. The secret containsm
qudits where each qudit is q-dimensional and
m = d− k + 1. (2)
Consider the vectors s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) in F
m
q
and r = (r1, r2, . . . , rm(k−1)) in F
m(k−1)
q . The
vector r is further split into m vectors r1 =
(r1, r2, . . . , rk−1), r2 = (rk, rk+1, . . . , r2(k−1)), . . .
rm = (r(m−1)(k−1)+1, r(m−1)(k−1)+1, . . . , rm(k−1)). The
vector r1 alone is further split into two vectors with its first
(k −m) values in u and the remaining (m− 1) values in v.
Let x1, x2, ..., xn be distinct nonzero elements from
Fq. Define the Vandermonde matrix Vn,d to be the n × d
matrix whose (i, j)th entry is given by xj−1i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and 1 ≤ j ≤ d. Assume that Vn,d is known to all the
parties involved. Let si, rj ∈ Fq, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
1 ≤ j ≤ m(k − 1). We define the following matrix Y .


s1
s2
...
0(m−1)×(m−1)
sm rk−m+1 rk−m+2 . . . rk−1
r1
r2
...
rk−1
rk r2(k−1)+1 . . . r(m−1)(k−1)+1
rk+1 r2(k−1)+2 . . . r(m−1)(k−1)+2
...
...
. . .
...
r2(k−1) r3(k−1) . . . rm(k−1)


(3)
3We also represent Y in a slightly compact form as follows.
Y =


s
0
vt
r1 r2 r3 . . . rm

 (4)
Consider the matrix C = Vn,dY where Y is defined as in
Eq. (3). Each entry in matrix C, cij is a function of s and r.
The encoding for the basis states (s1, . . . , sm) ∈ F
m
q is given
by E , where
E : |s1s2 . . . sm〉 7→
∑
r∈Fm(k−1)q
2k−1⊗
i=1
|ci1ci2 . . . cim〉 , (5)
where we have omitted the normalizing factor. The qudits in
the share of the ith participant are indexed by i. The first share
contains the first m qudits, the second share contains the next
set ofm qudits and so on till the (2k − 1)th share.
Lemma 1 (Recoverability for non-minimal authorized sets).
For the encoding scheme given in Eq. (5), we can recover the
secret from any d shares by accessing only the first qudit in
each share.
Proof. We shall prove this by giving the sequence of oper-
ations to be performed so that the d shares can recover the
secret with only d qudits. Each of the d participants sends
their first qudit to the combiner for reconstructing the secret.
Let D = {i1, i2, . . . , id} ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , 2k − 1} be the set of d
shares chosen and E = {id+1, id+2, . . . , i2k−1} be the com-
plement of D. Let VD and VE be the matrices containing the
rows of Vn,d corresponding to D and E respectively. Then,
Eq. (5) can be rearranged as∑
r∈Fm(k−1)q
|ci1,1 ci2,1...cid,1〉 |cid+1,1 cid+2,1...ci2k−1,1〉
|(ci1,2 ci2,2...ci2k−1,2)...(ci1,m ci2,m...ci2k−1,m)〉 ,
where we have highlighted (in color) the qudits accessed by
the combiner. Now using the fact that cij is the product of ith
row of Vn,q and jth column of Y and r = (r1, . . . , rm), we
can rewrite this as∑
r∈Fm(k−1)q
|VD(s, r1)〉 |VE(s, r1)〉 |V (0, rk−m+1, r2)〉 · · ·
· · · |V (0, rk−1, rm)〉
Since VD is a d × d Vandemonde matrix of full rank, we can
apply V −1D to the d qudits with the combiner to transform the
state as follows.∑
r∈Fm(k−1)q
|s, r1〉 |VE(s, r1)〉 |V (0, rk−m+1, r2)〉 · · ·
· · · |V (0, rk−1, rm)〉
Then from Eq. (3) we have r1 = (u, v), and rk−m+j = vj for
1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1, we can write
|s〉
∑
(v,r2,r3,..rm)
∈Fk(m−1)q
∑
u∈Fk−mq
|u〉 |v〉 |VE(s, u, v)〉 |V (0, v1, r2)〉 · · ·
· · · |V (0, vm−1, rm)〉
Since the combiner has access to |s〉, |u〉, and |v〉, we can
use the matrix VE , of rank k − m equal to the size of u, to
transform |u〉 to |VE(s, u, v)〉.
|s〉
∑
(v,r2,r3,..rm)
∈Fk(m−1)q
∑
u∈Fk−mq
|VE(s, u, v)〉 |v〉 |VE(s, u, v)〉
|V (0, v1, r2)〉 · · · |V (0, vm−1, rm)〉
Rearranging qudits |v〉 |VE(s, u, v)〉 to |VE(s, u, v)〉 |v〉,
|s〉
∑
(v,r2,r3,..rm)
∈Fk(m−1)q
( ∑
u∈Fk−mq
|VE(s, u, v)〉 |VE(s, u, v)〉
)
|v〉
|V (0, v1, r2)〉 · · · |V (0, vm−1, rm)〉
Since E is of size (2k − 1 − d), with Eq. (2), we see that
VE is a Vandermonde matrix of size (k − m) × d and rank
k − m < d. Therefore, the image of VE spans F
k−m
q and∑
u∈Fk−mq |VE(s, u, v)〉 |VE(s, u, v)〉 is independent of s. The
state can be written as
|s〉
∑
f∈Fk−mq
|f〉 |f〉
∑
(v,r2,r3,..rm)
∈Fk(m−1)q
|v〉 |V (0, v1, r2)〉
. . . |V (0, vm−1, rm)〉
The secret is now completely disentangled from the rest of the
system, therefore even when the secret is an arbitrary superpo-
sition we can recover the secret from d shares as claimed.
Lemma 2 (Recoverability for minimal authorized sets). For
the encoding scheme given in Eq. (5), we can recover the se-
cret by accessing (all) the qudits of any k shares.
Proof. For secret recovery from k shares, all the qudits
from each chosen share are sent to the user. Let K =
{j1, j2, . . . , jk} ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , 2k − 1} be the set of k shares
chosen and L = {jk+1, jk+2, . . . , j2k−1} be the complement
of K . Let VK and VL be the matrices containing the rows of
Vn,d corresponding to K and L respectively. Then, grouping
the (ith) qudits of K and L, the encoded state in Eq. (5) can
be written as∑
r∈Fm(k−1)q
|cj1,1 cj2,1 . . . cjk,1〉 · · · |cj1,m cj2,m . . . cjk,m〉
|cjk+1,1 cjk+2,1 . . . cj2k−1,1〉
· · · |cjk+1,m cjk+2,m · · · cj2k−1,m〉
This can be written in terms of VK and VL as∑
r∈Fm(k−1)q
|VK(s, r1)〉 |VK(0, rk−m+1, r2)〉 · · ·
|VK(0, rk−1, rm)〉
|VL(s, r1)〉 |VL(0, rk−m+1, r2)〉 · · ·
|VL(0, rk−1, rm)〉
Letting VK,ℓ be the submatrix of VK consisting of the last k
columns. Then we can simplify the state as∑
r∈Fm(k−1)q
|VK(s, r1)〉 |VK,ℓ(rk−m+1, r2)〉 ... |VK,ℓ(rk−1, rm)〉
|VL(s, r1)〉 |VL(0, rk−m+1, r2)〉 ... |VL(0, rk−1, rm)〉
4Since VK,ℓ is a k × k Vandermonde matrix of full rank, we
can apply VK,ℓ
−1 to further transform the state as∑
r∈Fm(k−1)q
|VK(s, r1)〉 |rk−m+1, r2〉 ... |rk−1, rm〉 |VL(s, r1)〉
|VL(0, rk−m+1, r2)〉 ... |VL(0, rk−1, rm)〉
Then from Eq. (3) we have r1 = (u, v), and rk−m+j = vj
is the jth entry in v for 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, and rearranging the
qudits, we can write the state as∑
r∈Fm(k−1)q
|VK(s, u, v)〉 |v〉 |r2, r3, . . . rm〉 |VL(s, r1)〉
|VL(0, rk−m+1, r2)〉 · · · |VL(0, rk−1, rm)〉
Let VK,f be the first k columns of VK and VK,f¯ be the subma-
trix of remaining columns. Note that VK,f¯ hasm−1 columns.
Then VK(s, u, v) = VK,f (s, u) + VK,f¯ (v). Thus, the above
state can be written as,∑
r∈Fm(k−1)q
|VK,f (s, u) + VK,f¯ (v)〉 |v〉 |r2, r3, . . . rm〉
|VL(s, r1)〉
|VL(0, rk−m+1, r2)〉 · · · |VL(0, rk−1, rm)〉
At this point the combiner has access to |v〉 and can subtract
VK,f¯ (v) from |VK,f (s, u) + VK,f¯ (v)〉 to obtain∑
r∈Fm(k−1)q
|VK,f (s, u)〉 |v〉 |r2, r3, . . . rm〉 |VL(s, u, v)〉
|VL(0, rk−m+1, r2)〉 · · · |VL(0, rk−1, rm)〉
Since VK,f is a k × k Vandermonde matrix of full rank, we
can apply VK,f
−1 to extract |s〉 as shown below.∑
r∈Fm(k−1)q
|s〉 |u〉 |v〉 |r2, r3, . . . rm〉 |VL(s, u, v)〉
|VL(0, rk−m+1, r2)〉 · · · |VL(0, rk−1, rm)〉
= |s〉
∑
r∈Fm(k−1)q
|r1〉 |r2, r3, . . . rm〉 |VL(s, r1)〉
|VL(0, rk−m+1, r2)〉 · · · |VL(0, rk−1, rm)〉
Since VL is a (k − 1) × d matrix of rank k − 1, we can now
modify each of the registers |ri〉 of size (k− 1) qudits, |r1〉 to
|VL(s, r1〉 and |ri〉 for 2 ≤ i ≤ m, to |VL(0, rk−m+i−1, ri)〉.
|s〉
∑
r∈Fm(k−1)q
|VL(s, r1)〉
|VL(0, rk−m+1, r2) . . . VL(0, rk−1, rm)〉
|VL(s, r1)〉
|VL(0, rk−m+1, r2) . . . VL(0, rk−1, rm)〉
On rearranging the qudits, we obtain
|s〉
∑
r1∈Fk−1q
|VL(s, r1)〉 |VL(s, r1)〉∑
r2∈Fk−1q
|VL(0, rk−m+1, r2)〉 |VL(0, rk−m+1, r2)〉
. . .∑
rm∈Fk−1q
|VL(0, rk−1, rm)〉 |VL(0, rk−1, rm)〉
VL is a Vandermonde matrix of size (k − 1) × d with d >
k − 1. So the image of VL is of dimension k − 1. There-
fore
∑
r
i
∈Fk−1q |VL(0, rk−m+i−1, ri)〉 |VL(0, rk−m+i−1, ri)〉
is a uniform superposition independent of rk−m+i−1, for
2 ≤ i ≤ m.
|s〉
∑
r1∈Fk−1q
|VL(s, r1)〉 |VL(s, r1)〉∑
f
2
∈Fk−1q
|f
2
〉 |f
2
〉 . . .
∑
f
m
∈Fk−1q
|f
m
〉 |f
m
〉
Now we can show that
∑
r1∈Fk−1q |VL(s, r1)〉 |VL(s, r1)〉 is a
uniform superposition independent of s, since VL has rank
k − 1.
|s〉
∑
f
1
∈Fk−1q
|f
1
〉 |f
1
〉 · · ·
∑
f
m
∈Fk−1q
|f
m
〉 |f
m
〉
At this point the state is given by the above expressionwith the
secret completely disentangled from the rest of the system and
we can recover any arbitrary superposition. This completes
the proof that k shares can recover the secret.
Lemma 3 (Secrecy). In the encoding scheme defined in
Eq. (5), any k − 1 or lesser number of shares do not give
any information about the secret |s〉.
Proof. The encoding scheme is a pure state encoding scheme
with the total number of shares n = 2k−1. If some set of k−1
or lesser number of shares give any information about the se-
cret, then the secret cannot be recovered from the remaining k
or more number of shares, because of the no-cloning theorem.
However, from Lemma 2, any k shares are enough to recover
the secret completely. Hence, no set of k−1 (or lesser number
of) shares give any information about the secret.
With these results in place we have our central result.
Theorem 1 (Communication efficient QSS). The encoding
given in Eq. (5) gives rise to a ((k, 2k − 1, d)) quantum
secret sharing scheme where d is a fixed integer satisfying
k ≤ d ≤ 2k−1. The scheme shares a secret ofm = d−k+1
qudits. The communication cost for any k participants to re-
cover the secret is mk qudits, while the communication cost
for any d participants is d qudits.
A standard ((k, 2k − 1)) QTS will incur a communication
cost of km qudits to sharem qudits. A subtle point to be noted
is that the communication efficient scheme requires the dealer
to share a larger secret.
An ((k, 2k− 1)) QTS can be converted to ((k, n)) QTS for
k ≤ n ≤ 2k − 1 by throwing away or ignoring 2k − 1 − n
shares of the ((k, 2k − 1)) scheme, [3, Theorem 1]. If n <
2k − 1, then the scheme is a mixed state scheme. Therefore,
Theorem 1 implies the existence of ((k, n, d)) quantum secret
sharing schemes where k ≤ d ≤ n ≤ 2k − 1. Note that a
((k, n)) QTS cannot exist for n ≥ 2k by [3, Theorem 2].
Next we show that the proposed secret sharing schemes are
optimal with respect to the communication cost. We need the
following lemma due to Gottesman [4, Theorem 5].
5Lemma 4. Even in the presence of pre-existing entanglement,
sending an arbitrary state from a Hilbert space of dimension
h requires a channel of dimension h.
Lemma 5 (Secret replacement with authorized set). A party
having access to an authorized set of shares in a quantum se-
cret sharing scheme can replace the secret encoded with any
arbitrary state (of the same dimension as the secret) without
disturbing the remaining shares. After this replacement, se-
cret recovery from any of the authorized sets will give only the
new state.
Proof. Let A ⊆ [1, n] be an arbitrary authorized set in the
given quantum secret sharing scheme and B be its comple-
ment. Let E : S → A ⊗ B denote the operation for encoding
the secret and RA : A → S be the operation required for
recovering the secret from the authorized set A.
If |φ〉 is the secret encoded, then the encoding can be given
as E |φ〉 |0〉 where |0〉 represents the ancilla qudits. To replace
the secret |φ〉 with the arbitrary state |ψ〉 of the same dimen-
sion, perform the following steps on the set A: i) Recover the
secret |φ〉 usingRA by acting only on A. The joint state with
A and B becomes |φ〉 〈φ| ⊗ ρ where |φ〉 is with A and ρ is
jointly with A and B and independent of |φ〉. ii) Swap the se-
cret |φ〉 with the arbitrary state |ψ〉 iii) Encode |ψ〉 but using
R†A ⊗ IB by acting on the state |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ ρ. Note that all
these steps do not involve any operations on the shares in B.
After these steps, the final state of qudits with A and B is the
same as E |ψ〉 |0〉. The recovery operation by any authorized
set from the n shares remains the same as before but the state
recovered is |ψ〉.
Application of Lemma 5 in the proof of our next lemma is
similar to [4, Theorem 6]. However, Lemma 5 is convenient
and sufficient for our work. In the next theorem, we prove a
lower bound on the communication cost for a ((k, n, d)) quan-
tum secret sharing scheme. We build on the ideas of Gottes-
man [4] and Huang et al [10].
Lemma 6. In any ((k, 2k−1, d))QSS scheme, which recovers
a secret of dimension M from any set of d shares, the total
communication to the combiner from any d − k + 1 shares
among the d shares is of dimension at leastM .
Proof. We prove this by means of a communication proto-
col between Alice and Bob based on the QSS scheme. Alice
needs to send an arbitrary state |ψ〉 of dimensionM to Bob.
First, encode the pure state |0〉 using the given QSS scheme.
Consider any set of d participantsD such that each participant
inD can send a part of its share to the combiner to recover the
secret. Consider any subset L ⊆ D with d− k + 1 shares.
A third party, say Carol, is given the k − 1 shares from the
set D\L. Alice is given the d − k + 1 shares from L and all
the remaining 2k − 1 − d shares in the scheme. If Bob wants
to reconstruct the secret by accessing some qudits from each
of the d shares in D, both Alice and Carol have to communi-
cate some qudits from each share in L and D\L respectively.
Next, Carol sends the qudits needed for this reconstruction
from each share inD\L to Bob.
Clearly, Bob has no prior information on |ψ〉 even though
he may share some entanglement with Alice due to qudits he
received earlier from Carol. Now, instead of directly transmit-
ting |ψ〉 to Bob, Alice can exploit the secret sharing scheme
for the communication. Using the authorized set of k shares
she already has, Alice replaces the secret |0〉 in the scheme
with |ψ〉 (by Lemma 5). Then, she transmits the qudits from
the shares in L which Bob needs to reconstruct the encoded
secret. Now, Bob uses the qudits received from shares in both
L and D\L to reconstruct the secret |ψ〉. By Lemma 4, the
communication from the shares in L has to be at leastM .
Theorem 2 (Lower bound on communication cost). In any
((k, 2k − 1, d)) quantum secret sharing scheme, recovery of
a secret of dimension M from d shares requires communi-
cation of a state from a Hilbert space of dimension at least
Md/(d−k+1) to the combiner.
Proof. Consider any set of d participants D such that each
participant inD can send a part of its share to the combiner to
recover the secret. Label the part of ith share in D communi-
cated to the combiner as Hi such that
dim(H1) ≥ dim(H2) ≥ . . . ≥ dim(Hd) (6)
Applying Lemma 6 for the set {Hk, Hk+1, . . . Hd} which
is the overall communication from a set of d− k + 1 shares,
d∏
i=k
dim(Hi) ≥M (7)
Then by Eq. (6), we have
dim(Hk) ≥M
1/(d−k+1) and dim(Hi)≥M1/(d−k+1) (8)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. From Eq. (7) and (8), the communication to
the combiner from the d shares inD can be lower bounded as
d∏
i=1
dim(Hi) =
k−1∏
i=1
dim(Hi)
d∏
i=k
dim(Hi) (9)
≥ (
k−1∏
i=1
M1/(d−k+1))M =Md/d−k+1) (10)
This shows that the set of d participants in D must commu-
nicate a state that is in a Hilbert space of dimension atleast
Md/(d−k+1). This completes the proof.
If we let M = qℓ, then we obtain the following corol-
lary which immediately implies the optimality of the proposed
schemes.
Corollary 1 (Optimality of proposed schemes). Any ((k, 2k−
1, d)) QSS scheme sharing ℓ qudits incurs a communication
cost of ≥ dℓd−k+1 qudits. The ((k, 2k − 1, d)) QSS scheme of
Theorem 1 has optimal communication cost (for fixed d).
6In this paper we have proposed communication efficient
quantum secret sharing schemes and demonstrated their opti-
mality with respect to communication cost. There are many
further directions for research, some which generalize the
classical analogues [9–14] to the quantum setting. For in-
stance, it is natural to study secret sharing schemes that are
efficient with variable d as studied classically in [9]. Another
direction for research is that of general access structures.
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